

The Eastern Orthodox Singing “Ψαλτική” and its Epistemological Approach: Possibilities and Limits

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Abstract. The paper has two parts. The first examines critically the assumption that the Christian singing known as ψαλτική (hereafter psaltiki) is or can be an autonomous science. The second is about the same singing, but as a subject of teaching and learning. In the first part, the focus is on the fundamental modern understanding of what is science as crucial for the general methodological question facing vocal musical phenomena. The second is focused on psaltiki as an oral tradition which has to be approached systematically by means of a proper method. Thus, the two parts are organized from the general to the particular. This following of the "objective approach" is an attempt to recognize the individual and characteristic place of psaltiki in musicology without, at the same time, excluding it from the general field of any science and, consequently, from the field of (musical) hermeneutics.

Περίληψη. Λέμε ότι το άδειν της ορθοδόξου χριστιανικής Ανατολής είναι από μία πλευρά προφορική παράδοση και από άλλη Ψαλτική τέχνη. Εδώ η λέξη «τέχνη» δείχνει ότι περιλαμβάνει μεθόδους (π.χ. εκμάθησης). Μία μέθοδος, όμως, προϋποθέτει ύπαρξης σαφούς μεθοδολογίας και εδώ επικεντρώνω την προσοχή μου, στη μεθοδολογία ως βασικό παράγοντα της επιστημονικής ψαλτικής προσέγγισης. Από απλώς διανοητική πολυμάθεια δεν «έχω» πρόσβαση προς έναν εκκλησιαστικό ήχο. Αυτό είναι το τρανό πρόβλημα της κάθε τροπικής (modal) μουσικής, όπου οι νότες δεν έχουν ανεξάρτητη ύπαρξη και το ύψος τους αλλάζει σχετικά με το προηγούμενο ή το επόμενο φθόγγο. Στη κάθε τροπική μουσική ακριβώς η παράδοση, τα «σωστά ακούσματα» που λέμε, είναι το βασικό, εάν όχι και το μοναδικό κριτήριο που επιβεβαιώνει την αληθινότητα αυτού που ακούγεται και πρέπει να ακουσθεί. Εδώ πρόκειται για ασφαλώς αντίθετες σχέσεις μεταξύ *musicus* και *cantor*. Ο ισχυρισμός ότι μπορούμε να δώσουμε ακριβή, αντικειμενικά επιστημονική παρουσίαση των ήχων απέχει από την ρηθείσα αληθινότητα. Η επιστήμη ως γραπτός λόγος και ως σημειωτική προσπάθεια, θέλει να έχει ένα κριτήριο, κεντρικό αφετηριακό σύστημα μέσα στο οποίο το φαινόμενο της συγκεκριμένης αντικειμενικής του μελέτης να είναι αναγνωριζόμενο πάντα ως αυτό και το ίδιο. Τέτοια, όμως, επιστημονικότητα εκ των προτέρων αλλάζει το φαινόμενο και εδώ είναι το βασικό ζήτημά του μουσικολόγου – οι σχέσεις μεταξύ του διανοητικού (ρασιοναλιστικού) και του παραδοσιακού. Πώς δύναται να έχει πρόσβαση προς την πράξη, που είναι μέσα από τη (μία) παράδοση, την παράδοση του «ούτως το έλεγεν ο δάσκαλός μου». Για μένα η μεθοδολογική λύση βρίσκεται εκεί που γίνονται προσπάθειες για κράτηση ενώπιον του νοός τριών βασικών πραγμάτων (1ον) τι ως φαινόμενον ακούγεται ή, αντίστοιχα, ψάλλεται (2ον) πώς το σκεφτόμαστε (3ον) πώς μπορούμε να το αντιληφθούμε παιδαγωγικά. Μέσα από αυτή τη μεθοδολογική λογική, πρέπει να διασφαλίζεται η προσέγγιση του εν άσματος φαινομένου και ταυτόχρονα να μην αποκρύπτεται η ορθολογιστική του αδιαφάνεια.

1. THE MODERN SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING

Before recognizing a particular field of reflective thinking as an “autonomous science”, we need to clarify what we mean by “science”. To begin with, “what is science?” is a philosophical question (above all metaphysical one) and we can find various answers given to it in the works of philosophers

throughout the ages. One of the most detailed – and at the same time most succinct ones – is that of Martin Heidegger. In his paper *Science and Reflection*, Heidegger gives the remarkable definition “Science is the theory of the real”[1]. To define the key words “theory” and “real”, he describes the radical difference between the ancient-medieval and the modern understanding of the two. Heidegger argues that we cannot replace the basic Modern age character/istics of the “real”:

“The real – he says, – is what presences as self-exhibiting. But what presences shows itself in the modern age in such a way as to bring its presencing to a stand in objectness. Science corresponds to this holding-sway of presencing in terms of objects, inasmuch as it for its part, as theory [of the real], challenges forth [*herausfordern* – call, “demand-out-hither”] the real specifically through aiming its objectness. Science sets [*stellen*] upon the real. It orders it into place to the end that at any given time the real will exhibit itself as an interacting network, i.e., in surveyable series of related causes. The real thus becomes surveyable and capable of being followed out in its sequences. The real becomes secured in its objectness. From this there result spheres or areas of objects that scientific observation can entrap after its fashion. Entrapping representation, which secures everything in that objectness which is thus capable of being followed out, is the fundamental characteristic of the representing through which modern science corresponds to the real”[2].

This passage gives us a precise icon of modern science, how this science works in order to approve its inner desire to be the most important font of truth in terms of certainty or, at least, of access to that certainty. The certainty is guaranteed by the authority of the modern scientific method of observation, which is, on the other hand, based initially on the new subject-object observation, pointed out by Descartes. *Cogito (ergo) sum* is not just the newest method for justifying “my” existence and the dependence of the starting-point of my personality from “cogito”, but it is constitutive for any scientific “true belief”. In our case *cogito sum* is equal to *cogito, ergo certum mihi est* (in thinking is my certainty). Thereafter the reality of any certain *est* (existence) is accessible for the man only on the base of the reflective thinking – the thinking, which thinks its own action, i.e. has self-consciousness. The certainty, namely, of that consciousness is the foundation of all modern European science. Proofs and evidences as part of science are now warrantable only and if they are the results of cogitative observation(s).

The title of Descartes’ treatise alone is sufficiently illustrative for his aims: *Discourse on the Method for Conducting One’s Reason well and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences*[3]. Allow me put here the first of his famous “étals” or rules: “The first was never to accept anything as true that I did not plainly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid hasty judgment and prejudice; and to include nothing more in my judgments than what presented itself to my mind (in French “spirit” – comm. JB) so clearly and so distinctly that I had no occasion to call it in doubt”[4]. Comparing these words of Heidegger and Descartes, we can easily conclude that the main question of which general or particular human activity can be accepted as science and, respectively, as autonomous science has its answer simply as: only one sort of our activities can be taken as science – that of cogitative thinking on the phenomena we encounter, which obligatorily produces theory for these and similar phenomena. The theory, as a result of the mentioned thinking, is *nécessaire* in order to constitute general and complete knowledge about the singular phenomena, which knowledge by now we can understand, teach and learn, even without taking part in observation these phenomena or, more, without “meeting” them. It means that the science could be only one and we cannot really have two, three, four etc. sciences. That is, obviously, because the thinking which makes science possible as such is only of one sort. That is why the science whether exists or not, it is whether present or absent. Present is in observing the phenomena we first meet with as perceptions and impression, according to the law of cogitation and thus, of objectiveness. What constitutes an autonomous science is the existence of a law, which comes from other than cogitative and analytical source (a self, private *nomos*). However, Descartes proved that there is one only autonomy, which is able to found science – the autonomy of “cogito”. Thus, there is no point to seek after an “autonomous science”. It will be a *contradictio in se*, meaningless trial to find one “regular”, another “free”, another “independent”, another “autonomous” science. Yes, we do speak about sciences (in plural). Descartes does it as well: “When I was younger, I had

studied, among the parts of philosophy, a little logic, and among those of mathematics, a bit of geometrical analysis and algebra— three arts or sciences that, it seemed, ought to contribute something to my plan”[5]. Here Descartes equalizes art to science, and the opposite, explaining clearly why: “... all those particular sciences commonly called "mathematical"; ... even though their objects differed, these sciences did not cease to be all in accord with one another in considering nothing but the various relations or proportions which are found in their objects (shadowed font mine, JB)”[6].

In conclusion, we see that what put together different arts or sciences, is the common proportions for all objects, which the given science figures out and analyzes. Using plural, “sciences”, we are simply speaking about different branches on the same tree of science.

1.1 Science as Music and Musicology

The historical relationship between music and mathematics is quite well known. It was because of the measurement of the sound, music was considered, until 17th c., a branch of science. In late Antiquity it was part of the quadrivium, and thus, the mentioned equating of arts with sciences could be a historical continuation of this mathematical understanding of music [7]. And yet, the main change, which takes constitutive position with the Modern age, is the possibility measuring (calculation) in terms of Western developed punctual thinking to be taken as the most important assistant for the basic theoretical goal of the European musicology – through maximum precise notation system to make accessible and reasonable the existing, live (and thinkable) musical phenomenon and thus, to be able to preserve even oral traditions which are entirely vocal. One can admire the theoretical, e.g., success of Prince Dimitrie Cantemir. About 50 years after Descartes’ death, he invented a new theoretical system of notation which helped the musician to notate in an accurate and analytical way entire compositions of ottoman classical music. The idea came to him after reflections on “the pragmatic attitude of western musicians. Music should be written down with notes to be read, learned and performed from notation, – and then passed on to next generation... The purpose of a new theory based upon music literacy was to place music education within a pragmatic modern foundation, and to reconcile the two domains separated by old theoreticians, namely the theory from practice... Cantemir is the first theorist of Islamic music to enhance music notation as the core of theoretical approach (emphasis’ JB)”[8].

However, Cantemir’s theoretical invention – notation, method and methodology – had not being taken as an autonomous science or scientific experiment. Nor it happened with Guido’s *solmization*, nor with any of the theoretical musical systems [9]. The science as positive knowledge is legitimate, and exists, only under the criterion of “objectivity” – objectivity for and of any particular phenomenon. Objective knowledge means repeating of the observation, in order to guaranty the same results as in the beginning of the experiment. In other words, it is about standardization of the phenomena. That could be possible only if the phenomenon is not observable as unique, but as something familiar and common. Thus, in the case of singing for example, the science does not see unique human *voices* or personal voice-tradition, but objective pitches or physical vibrations, sections which are inaccessible to the reason unless by normative measuring procedures. To be scientifically correct requires measuring these pitches, dividing, defining and fixing them and afterwards, following the results of these operations as a norm of the objective access to the tradition. For the scientific approach, if pitches, intervals, scales, systems etc. used in two oral or non-oral practices seem to be similar or equal, it means that we have sufficient knowledge about these traditions and have already understood them. Further, because of the structural or other external similarities one (theorist) could feel free to assert even the dependence of one of them to the other. To illustrate this point it will be sufficient to look at the theoretical effort “to prove” that Byzantine music, which historically did not exist as “Byzantine”, has its origins in the Judaic tradition or, conversely, that all the music of the Near East is based on ancient Greek culture [10]. Obviously here we are faced with something different than both science and tradition, or the achievements of one tradition. The pseudo-scientific way of justification behind such claims works “from structures” to “personal tradition” and from there towards “ethnic argument”. In addition, if one applies this research principle to another field, he

would find no differences between, for example, Greeks and Russians or between my twin brother and me. Indeed, we are all not just similar, but we are identical in physiological structure and neurological mechanisms of body and mind. That is why science and the scientific method have nothing to do with any personality and, correspondingly, cannot give any correct answer to the question of tradition.

Hence the deep questions about truth and truthfulness elude the grasp of scientific methodology, for, as Gadamer has aptly demonstrated "the human sciences are connected to modes of experience that lie outside science: with the experiences of philosophy, of art, and of history itself. These are all modes of experience in which a truth is communicated that cannot be verified by the methodological means proper to science" [11].

2. ORAL TRADITION AND HERMENEUTICS

In the Christian ecclesiastical music of the East, known as psaltiki, we see two main characteristics. The first one is that this is an oral tradition, which in many ways is similar to other oral traditions; the second is that this tradition is solely vocal [12], as few other traditions are. Here "oral" is the opposite of "written" and in this sense we can have oral traditions in the teaching of instruments as well (as many *gaida* players in the Rodope mountains, for example, still learn tunes from their teachers without the help of written music). Psaltiki, being precisely such an oral tradition, has the same status in the eyes of people who are not personally involved in it: for them, it is not a culture in the sense of providing a "universal value". In other words, such traditions are not "for anyone" who happens to be interested. We cannot have a world-cup competition and elect a world champion in psaltiki, or in folk songs and traditional story telling. To participate in an oral tradition is not comparable even to playing European classical music or conducting scientific research. I am free to play Mozart or experiment in chemistry, regardless of the place where I am playing or conducting experiments, and regardless of my religious beliefs. Anyone can drive my car provided they have learned to drive *a* car, but learning psaltiki as an oral tradition is always something strange, hermetic, mysterious and even mystical. The access to such an oral tradition is not by logic or with the help of an external objective knowledge, but always from the "inside", by experiencing and dedicating oneself to the life of the community where this tradition lives. The "secret" of the tradition is something that cannot be disclosed by an education from the outside, mechanism or, broadly, mathematical procedures. Objective knowledge recognizes structures and similarities (in our case, these are the ecclesiastical *tones*). Anybody, even people, who do not sing or play at all, can learn these musical "structures" and can be brilliantly good at identifying and analyzing them. There is no problem for me to learn a given scale with its proportions or to find a name and a way of defining it. However, this alone will never allow me – as an outsider – to represent the tradition in which I found these scales used, to understand "what happens there". Even less, I cannot involve myself in it. It is easy for me to take a scale, described in one ancient or medieval treatise and to pretend that I know what the living tradition of those times was, but what I do, in the end, is just pretend. Once dead, an oral musical tradition can never be restored. If there is no more "grannies" who know the way of singing the songs of a particular region, even the written text of the song (in the case we have such a text) cannot help me at all to restore this tradition, except of course as in a museum, i.e. as a lifeless exhibit. Structures and scales are repeatable and we can easily put them down on a sheet, or even stone, but without the holder of their living face, they are only dead monuments.

Thus, scientific methodology and the knowledge delivered by objective research focus only on data excluding the personal stories of those who deliver the data. The continuation of a tradition, on the other hand, depends on the personal choice and devotion of a disciple to a living teacher. It is well-known fact that the classical academic training in music, however advanced, is never sufficient to give one access to the knowledge (different from the scientific one) of how to sing an ecclesiastical tone (ἥχος). What is required of the chanter-to-be is to have "listened" well to an authoritative teacher, to have had a personal ear-experience under close supervision. The more I participate in the tradition, the more its secrets are getting closer and clearer for me. In front of an oral tradition, I am in a hermeneutic milieu like nowhere else. Here, the assessment of my place in it is coming only from inside of my personal relationships with the teacher and my participation in his or her way of "making" it, and not from any rational understanding of it. Thus, the true existing of one vocal oral

tradition depends on the live interpretation, which as a theoretical issue is part of the realm of philosophy and, particularly, of hermeneutics.

From the work of great thinkers like Martin Heidegger, Ortega y Gasset, Gabriel Marcel, Hans Georg Gadamer we already know that even the smallest objectivity or *factus* [13] in our life is the result of personal participation and interpretation. It means that I am always in a hermeneutic situation and nothing in my life is a simple everyday occurrence. Here the only one indisputable "fact" is that I am essentially alone with my situation. It is not the roundabout world, but I am the only one, who is changeable. In his work "Being and Time" Heidegger clearly explains that the being which is able to have a *world* is me as *Dasein*. My treatment of the phenomena which I meet in my life requires of me to "decide" about them, to "compose" them into a world. In this general philosophical field, musical philosophy adds the theme of the unique place of the musical act as regards the hermeneutic situation therefore as a hermeneutic act, psaltiki has again no autonomy. Here traditional folk songs could serve as an excellent example for clarifying the place of psaltiki in universal musical hermeneutics. As the world-famous pianist, composer and collector of original folk melodies Percy Grainger (1882-1961) has argued:

"Undoubtedly the world's most lovely melodies are found in folk-songs. [...] This is quite natural. Folk-songs are, in almost all cases, melodies without accompaniment of any kind, and the folk-singer, singing entirely alone, is able to concentrate all his creative powers upon expression in a single line – by which I mean the curves and contrasts of sound given out by a single voice or instrument" [14].

What we see in Grainger is that the first and the most fundamental criterion of the oral music tradition is the human voice. Any other non-vocal or better non voice-related criterion would be essentially external and thus inconvenient, a sort of a compromise. Being once accepted, the external criterion can be rejected at any time, if it does not respond to the tradition and does not represent it. For the oral-song tradition, the arguments of epistemology are initially not applied. That is because the judgment and the decision of "what must happen and what is the correct way of making it happen" are always in the hands of the voice of the tradition's holder/performer. The proof for a given claim of truth appears here not as a result of a scientific method, as one part of the "justification of the true beliefs", but as a unique experience resting on the personal choice of a living man (*homo, άνθρωπος*). There is no place for democracy, because the "truth" belongs to one *magister*: this truth has no relation to anything external to the *magister*'s voice, and cannot depend on any *instrumentum*. The phrase "This is the way my teacher was singing the song" is not only a common rule, but also the principle, which builds up and guaranties the proper existence of the *psaltiki*. But what the words of Grainger cited above also show is that the same principle is behind any other oral folk tradition (regardless of whether we now possess it in written form or not). In fact, only because of the determinative observance of this principle any oral-tradition musicology is possible.

2.1 Hermeneutic Dignity of Neumatic Notation

The place of psaltiki is between the scientifically elaborated music, the Art-music, and the entirely liberal singing. As Grainger says:

"Art-music, being created solely or mainly by a single composer, develops great individuality in him, but suppresses individuality in the performer. [...] Folk music, on the other hand encourage almost unlimited individuality in the performer, to such an extent that it is hard to say, with such music, where the creative and executive roles begin and end" [15].

Even when recorded in neumatic notation, the melodies of this Orthodox singing are not compositions. We must remember that before the 1815s, the notation was not "punctual" and the student could not follow, or observe, the patterns and melodies note-by-note. The books with this notation are not *partiture di voce* (scores) but rather handbooks, helpful for recalling a previous experience, which includes not just melodies and patterns already imprinted in memory, but most of all the *way* of interpreting them. This rational has continued to guide the use of neumatic notation until our days, regardless of how we wish to view the reform of Chrysanthos[16]. Namely the notes are in use mainly for illustrating and explaining the authoritative experience of a given *magister* or

protopsaltis. The notation does not mean that the successors of these masters and, correspondingly, the successors of the successors are obliged to observe the notes, sung by their masters. This is the reason why vocal pieces can exist in the record both under the name of a given *psaltis* and as anonymous; it is the tradition which he represents and not the author himself as a concrete individual which is recorded. Furthermore, a given piece can also exist in many different musical forms inside the original *tone* or a subdivision of this tone. The modern history of printed psaltic books in Greece provides endless examples of this principle: plenty of different versions of a given song or type of tone all pretending to represent *the* tradition[17]. And it is precisely this principle, which defies all attempts for scientific precision, which ensures the survival and the continuing flourish of psaltiki as an oral tradition. Keeping the openness of the neumatic notation as a methodological prerequisite will guaranty the preservation of the real personal approaches to voice production and ear-abilities. The strength and the dignity of the neumatic notation come from the possibilities which it opens to singers and teachers: due to its hermetic character, it does not take away the personal freedom and the authority of each singer. Thus the musical thinking is focused on the singer as the interpreter of the tradition, and thus the whole treasure of non-written levels in it remains preserved. The neumatic notation also ensures that the musical phenomenon is approached naturally without demanding a fixed way of "seeing and hearing the notes"; the interpretation continues to depend on the singer as personally devoted to the tradition and this does not necessarily require the existence of a great musical talent.

To conclude, psaltiki cannot be an autonomous science as no other science is. It is, with respect to its scientific *object* (αντι-κείμεον, пред-мѣтъ, Gegen-stand), just a different musicology as many others. Nevertheless *psaltiki* is not something usual or often encountered, being simply difference as *differentia specierum* – as one of the many differences in the musical world. Not only is the experience which psaltiki requires very particular and unusual. The notation system, which it uses and which has not essentially changed its unique graphic appearance, is, so to speak, the best invented theoretical solution for the purposes for which it was created and thus, completely uncommon and, in the same time, requisite for the complete European musical erudition. It is also the most beautiful systems of *denoting* music (the way of how to "note" or to communicate on a paper what I have experienced as music) I have ever worked with.

REFERENCES

- [1] Heidegger, M. Science and Reflection, transl. William Lovitt – In: The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York and London, 1977, pp. 155-182, p. 157. For the general "inadequacy" and propriety "in this and other essays in this volume" of translating "Besinnung" with "reflection" see note 1 of the translator, p. 155.
- [2] Ibid. p. 167-168. In note 19 on "the real", William Lovitt actually describes the great difficulty for the English translator to find a proper correspondence of the rich sense-giving vocabulary of Heidegger, hence the need to consult the original German.
- [3] Hackett Publ. Co., Indianapolis 1998, transl. Donald A. Cress. The original title is *Discourse de la méthode: pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vérité dans les sciences*.
- [4] Discourse on..., op. cit., p. 11. The original French is: Le première estoit (était) de ne recevoir jamais aucune chose pour vrai que je ne la connusse évidemment être tell ; c'est-à-dire, d' éviter soigneusement la précipitation et la prévention, et de ne comprendre rien de plus en mes jugments que ce se présenterait si clairement et distinctement à mon esprit, que je n'eusse aucune occasion de le metre en doute. *Descartes, R.* Discourse de la méthode – In: *Ouvres de Descartes*, vol. VI, Paris, 1902, p. 18.
- [5] J'avais un peu étudié, étant plus jeune, entre la partie de la philosophie, à la logique, et, entre le mathématiques, à l'analyse des géométrie et de l'algèbre, trois arts ou sciences. Ibid. p. 17.
- [6] Discourse on..., ibid. The French original says: Toutes ces sciences particulières qu'on nomme communément mathématiques ; et voyant qu' encore que leurs objects soient différents elles ne laissent pas de s'accorder toutes, en ce qu'elles n'y concidèrent autre chose que les divers raporst ou proportions qui s'y trouvent. Ibid. p. 19-20.
- [7] About the difference between Ancient and Modern science, see the cited essay of Heidegger "Science and Reflection". About the speculative character of the Ancient and Medieval music science, see Герцман, Евгени. Синописис музыки или памятник агонии, Москва, 2000, с. 21-29.

- [8] At greater length, see *Popescu-Jdetz, Eugenia*. Prince Dimitrie Cantemir. Theorist and Composer of Turkish Music. Istanbul 1994. p. 38-40.
- [9] We can easily add here the Arabic invention of *tabulatura* notation or the systematic theory of Saḡī al-Dīn al-Urmawī "Book of the Circles".
- [10] For the first case see, for example, the book of *Egon Wellesz*, *A History of Byzantine Music and Hymnography*. Oxford 1998. For the second see the book of Γεωγίου Παπαδοπούλου, *Συμβουλαὶ εἰς τὴν ἱστορίαν τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς μουσικῆς*. Ἀθήναι 1890.
- [11] *Gadamer, H.G.* Truth and Method, first paperback ed. by Bloomsbury Academy, translated and revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, London, 2013, p. xxi.
- [12] Well-known, for instance, is the advice or, perhaps, order of Athanasius of Alexandria. Commenting on verse 8 of psalm 46, Ψάλατε συνετῶς, he says "Ψάλλετε συνετῶς. Μὴ διὰ κιθαρῶν, ὥς οἱ πρόωην· τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ, συνετῶς" – Sing wisely, not with guitars as your predecessors. That means "wisely". *Expositiones in Psalmos*, *Patrologia graeca*, vol. 27, col. 217.
- [13] The Latin word *factus* in all its meanings as 1) a participle from the verb *facio*, 2) an adjective – something done or happened; prepared; educated, 3) a noun – production, a make, is always in opposite side of *actus* – an act.
- [14] *Grainger, Percy*. A Commonsense View of all Music. Reprinted as Appendix A in: John Blacking, 'A commonsense view of all Music'. Reflections on Percy Granger's contribution to ethnomusicology and music education. Cambridge, 1990, p. 151.
- [15] *Ibid*, p. 153.
- [16] Normally we accept this notation as "full analytical", which is correct as regard to the punctuality of the quantitative signs; we can precisely write down all kinds of melodies of the Byzantine music. Nevertheless, it remains "hermetic" with respect at least to the intervals' size and the position of the *tone* (mode) bases.
- [17] Let us take Constantinos Pringos and Athanasios Pettas. Regardless of the fact that the former had been the protopsaltis and teacher at the Patriarchate in Constantinople and the latter – his disciple, the slow-fast *Kekragaria* of Pettas, for example, are quite different from those of Pringos. Moreover, we know that by the time Pettas was editing his books, the Pringos' volumes of Μουσική Κυψέλη was long time ago printed and favored by the lovers of the patriarchal style. See *Πρίγγος, Κωνσταντῖνος*. Ἡ πατριαρχικὴ φόρμιξ. Ἀναστασιματάριον. Ἀθήναι, 1974. σ. 15-16 with *Πέττας, Αθανάσιος*. Ὁ μέγας πανηγυρικός ἐσπερινός. Τόμος Δεύτερος. Ἀθήναι, 1994, p. 167-168.

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